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19. Identity 
John B. Davis 
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMICS AND IDENTITY 
The concept of identity has begun to be employed only relatively recently in econom-
ics, and accordingly still lacks a standard meaning and established set of applications 
in the subject. However, in its most influential initial uses by Amartya Sen (1999) and 
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000) it has been developed largely in terms of 
the concept of social identity (though in quite different ways). Social identity as under-
stood in social psychology (see Brown, 2000), where the concept was influentially devel-
oped by Erik Erikson in connection with his idea of an identity crisis (Erikson, 1950), 
concerns individuals' 'identification with' social groups of which they are members. 
There are different ways of understanding the idea of 'identification with,' with both 
more psychological and sociological types of interpretations, but generally it means 
that individuals treat the characteristics of the social group with which they identify as 
their own individual characteristics, for example, as when people think of themselves 
as individuals having a certain nationality, gender, or religion. Akerlof and Kranton, 
then, adopt this sort of understanding when they rewrite the standard utility function 
representation of the individual to include a vector of self-images which people are said 
to have in virtue of their having corresponding characteristics associated with certain 
social groups. Sen employs the same idea that social group characteristics and social 
identities are applied to individuals and influence how they think of themselves, but 
in contrast he also argues that individuals deliberate over whether to embrace these 
assignments. 
Understanding the concept of identity primarily in terms of social identity, however, 
creates a problem in that it leaves unexplained 'who' it is that identifies with social 
groups (Kirman and Teschl, 2004). Since social identity is understood in terms of the 
idea of 'identification with' others, it follows that we also need to be able to say what 
the individual's identity is 'apart from' others. Indeed, if the concept of identity is only 
explained in terms of the concept of social identity, then since individuals have many 
social identities, they must fragment across their many social identities, and have no 
distinct unitary identities as individuals. This is inconsistent with referring to them as 
individuals. Philosophers consequently address the idea that individuals are distinct 
unitary beings by focusing on the concept of personal identity (Noonan, 2003). Though 
there are many issues that this leads them to investigate within this framework, in 
general the concept of personal identity is understood to concern characteristics that 
~ake a person distinct from others, perhaps enduringly so. Nonetheless, this is not 
Incompatible with an individual having a collection of social identities, and indeed one 
way in which an individual could be said to have a distinct personal identity would 
?e to say that the individual is made up of a unique combination of different social 
Identities. In any case, given that people can have multiple social identities; and given 
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that economists treat people as individuals having social identities, it seems incumbent 
upon them to explain how their view of the individual relates social identity to personal 
identity (Davis, 2003). 
Another issue that economics' employment of the concept of social identity brings 
up concerns the behavioral implications of individuals having social identities and 
moreover of having multiple social identities. This is particularly important to the topic 
of philanthropy, reciprocity, and social enterprise - all ways in which people are other-
regarding and orient towards others - since not only can people's orientation towards 
others be understood as a reflection of their identification with them, but differences 
between the ways people have of orienting towards others can be understood in terms 
of the different kinds of social identities people have. Note, then, that when social 
psychologists investigate people's different kinds of social identities, they generally 
distinguish between '(i) those that derive from interpersonal relationships and inter-
dependence with specific others and (ii) those that derive from membership in larger, 
more impersonal collectives or social categories' (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Brewer 
2001). This can be understood to mean that individuals have social identities that are 
'identifications of the self as a certain kind of person' - a role-based social identity -
and they also have social identities involving 'identifications of the self with a group or 
category as a whole' - a collective social identity (Thoits and Virshup, 1997, p.l06). 
Thus broadly speaking people's social identities can be classified as being relational 
or categorical. They are relational when a person occupies a position in a 'relational 
web' (kinship, friendship, patron-client, team member, etc.), and socially identifies with 
another person or set of people to whom they are connected in this relational setting in 
a specific kind of way. They are categorical in regard to their 'sharing some categorical 
att~ibute.' with other like people (race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, language, class, 
nahonahty, sexual orientation, etc.) when a person socially identifies with another 
person as representative of that shared category (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, pp.15ff). 
<?ne wa~, then, in which philanthropy, reciprocity, and social enterprise can be inves-
hgated m economics is by asking how individuals' behavior and orientation towards 
others ~aries accor~ing to whether they identify socially with them in a relational or 
~ateg~ncal way .. Th~s per.spective links up with the previous question of how personal 
Idenhty and sOCial Identtty are connected, since an orientation 'towards' others - a 
matter of social ide.ntity. - presupposes the individual having such an orientation - a 
matt~r ~f perso?al!dentl.ty. The following section consequently looks more closely at 
how mdiVIduals onentatIOn towards others can be understood in overall identity termS 
when.we diff~rentiate between the different kinds of social identities individuals have, 
focusmg. specIfically on the concept of reciprocity and the different ways in which it can 
be explamed. 
IDENTITY AND RECIPROCITY 
~conomics chiefly e~plains an individual's orientation towards others in terms of the 
Idea of ot~er-re.gardmg or social preferences, framing this in terms of standard instru-
mental ratIOnalIty theory i h' h' d' '. .. 0 this 
view wh . " n w IC m IVlduals act In order to maximize utilIty. n 
, en mdlvlduals act on their social preferences, they gain utility when others are 
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better off. However, this analysis is limited in what it can explain about the nature of rec-
iprocity, since it implies that reciprocity is always conditional in nature in that a person 
only reciprocates the actions of others when in expectation of a private utility payoff. 
That is, by relying on standard rationality theory it leaves out all non-instrumentally 
rational reciprocal behavior which, as Luigino Bruni puts it, is unconditional in nature 
and not motivated by an expectation of a private payoff (Bruni, 2008). In such cases, the 
individual unilaterally reciprocates the action of another - a type of action which is ordi-
narily associated with altruism. Proponents of standard rationality theory generally deny 
such actions are rational, and reject the entire idea that people can be non-instrumentally 
rational, but this requires that they re-interpret and reformulate the testimony many 
people commonly express regarding this sort of 'selfless' behavior, in order to fit it into 
the standard view. Debates, however, over whether this is a reasonable strategy and 
about what rationality involves can be interminable, and so here the different ways in 
which reciprocity can be understood are tied to the different ways in which people have 
social identities to see what this can tell us. Specifically, it will be argued that categor-
ical social identities can generally be better explained in terms of instrumentally rational 
reciprocity behavior, while relational social identities often (but not always) need to be 
explained in terms of a non-instrumentally rational kind of behavior. 
Consider, then, the nature of the social distance between people involved in the two 
types of social identities, and also note that when people identify with a social group, 
they are actually identifying with other individuals in that social group through their 
membership in it. Here the idea of social distance may be taken to refer to degree of 
familiarity one has with a person with whom one identifies. Though there are many ways 
of explaining the idea of familiarity, one important aspect of it is the extent to which a 
person actually sees, has contact with, or personally interacts with another person. At 
one extreme, then, there are people with whom an individual identifies who they never 
see, have contact with, or interact with; at the other extreme, there are people whom a 
person regularly sees, has contact with, and interacts with. Thus taking identification 
with social groups to be a proxy for identification with individuals in those social groups, 
we can distinguish between categorical and relational social identities according to 
whether this involves close or distant contact. In the case of categorical social identities, 
clearly social distance is great and contact limited; in the case of relational social identi-
ties there is less social distance and much more contact. For example, if one is of a certain 
nationality - a categorical social identity - there are usually millions of individuals with 
Whom one identifies who one has never met nor ever will and who one only knows in 
the most abstract, representative sort of way. Alternatively, if one occupies a particular 
role or position in a family, community organization, business, or social networ~ - a 
relational social identity - there are not very many people with wh.om o~e ide?tIfies, 
and for those with whom one identifies one has specific types of relatIOnshIps whIch are 
understood in terms of regular as well as quite specific forms of interaction that one has 
with them. 
~elational social identities, then, tend to be tied to established, customary, instit-
UtIonalized, and rule-driven types of interaction between people. We need to un~erstand 
people relationally when we see them in this capacity, and understand .th~~ m t~~s 
?f social structures. Categorical social identities, in contrast, tend to b~ mdlvlduahzmg 
In the sense that each person having a given identity is equally and m the same way 
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a member of the set of all people having that social identity. They are in part social 
statistical artifacts and in part social organizational in nature. But because they apply 
homogeneously, there is generally nothing in the way in which people have categorical 
social identities that distinguishes one individual from the next, whereas people who 
share relational social identities are heterogeneous and distinguished from one another 
according to the ways in which they have them, reflecting their different positions and 
roles in the associated social groups on which these identities depend. This difference 
thus points to an important difference between the kinds of behavior people exhibit in 
connection with these different kinds of social identity. In the case of relational identi-
ties, the fact that people occupy positions and roles means that their behavior is consid-
erably more circumscribed by what they ought to do in those contexts in comparison 
with what is implied by their having categorical social identities. They also know what 
they ought to do according to what their circumstances dictate, and thus rely to an 
important degree on a non-instrumental rationality. This may also be true in important 
ways with respect to categorical social identities, in that a sense of obligation applies 
there also to membership in large social groups, though given the less structured way 
in which this sort of social identity operates, more space remains for instrumentally 
rational decision-making. 
This all accordingly allows us to distinguish different kinds of reciprocity, or at 
least a spectrum of forms of reciprocity associated with a spectrum of social identities. 
What Robert Trivers (1971) originally labeled 'reciprocal altruism' then gets placed at 
the end of the spectrum where instrumental rationality theory best applies, and what 
Bruni (2008) contrasts as a unilateral altruism best applies where rationality is non-
instrumental or deontological in nature (meaning in particular that it reflects a sense of 
obligation). Somewhere along this spectrum one would also want to include conceptions 
of reciprocity such as the much debated 'strong reciprocity' concept (e.g., Gintis, 2000; 
~ehr et a~, 200~). At the same time, we may draw a general conclusion about the econom-
ICS of recIprocIty and identity. That is, what we find when we look at the different forms 
?f social identity is that how we understand rationality depends upon how rationali~y 
IS endogen~us to individuals' social circumstances. That is, what counts as rational IS 
not somethmg ~e can determine in and of itself, axiomatically, and apart from how ~e 
~nderstand the Identity of individuals, especially in connection with their social identIty 
SIde. 
This then returns us to the question of how individuals with different social identities ~lso ?~ve personal identities associated with 'who' it is that has those different social IdentItI~s. The di~cussion. ab.o~e tells us that relational and categorical social identit~es ~ean dIfferent thmgs to mdlvlduals, implying that they contribute to personal identIty ~lf~e~ent1Y',Though t~ere ~r~ many ways this issue can be approached, one view is ~~at mdlvldu~ls pers?nalldentltIes depend on how they use their relational social identltl~S 
to ~rgamze and mt~rpret their categorical social identities (Davis, 2011, 20lff). That IS, 
theIr ~loser connectIOns to others in their positions and roles are a key to their approach ~o th~lr more distant connections to others in large social groups. This makes personal 
IdentIty first and foremost relational in nature. To show how such a view might be 
developed, two di~erent recent accounts of personal identity treated as relational in 
nature, ~oth of whIch emphasize social identity and reciprocity are the subject of the 
next sectIOn. ' 
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TWO VIEWS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AS RELATIONAL IN 
NATURE 
Michael Bacharach (2006) develops a game-theoretic conception of the single individual 
as a being who possesses multiple selves which function together as a team. When indi-
viduals are faced with a choice of action, Bacharach argues that rather than seeing the 
person asking, 'what should I do?' we ought to see the person's multiple selves asking, 
'what should we do?' On his view, an individual's multiple selves are simply all the per-
son's social identities, so that we have a sub-personal self for each social identity we have. 
This is central to Bacharach's account of why the personal identity of the individual can 
be understood as a team, because having a social identity (he primarily means categorical 
social identity) is akin to having membership in a team. Thus, just as one's many social 
identity selves each identify with the teams/social groups to which they belong, so they 
also have the same capacity to identify with the team made up of the single person to 
which they belong. This makes the individual's personal identity explicitly relational in 
nature in that what makes the individual a single distinct person is the relations they 
have to others through their identification with them in social groups. For comparison, 
it is a different kind of view from one that says individuals may act on team preferences 
(Sugden, 2000) - a kind of social preference - since these views attribute such preferences 
to a unitary individual rather than make the individual itself a team. 
Another view of personal identity as relational in nature derives from collective inten-
tionality theory (e.g, Searle, 1995; Gilbert, 1989; Tuomela and Miller, 1988). Collective 
intentionality theory examines the behavior of individuals when their intentions are 
formed in social settings and expressed in first person plural 'we' language rather than in 
first person singular 'I' language. An important difference between 'we' intentions and'!' 
intentions concerns their conditions of success. To successfully express an'!, intention, 
a person needs to use language correctly to communicate that intention. In the case of 
'we' intentions, however, not only must this be true, but those to whom this is expressed 
must agree with the content of the intention since the 'we' binds them as well to what has 
been said (Davis, 2002). Thus, a person fails to successfully express a 'we' intention about 
something if those to whom it applies reject what has been said. Individuals, ?f course, 
regularly express 'we' intentions, as shown by the cross-language nature of thIS form. of 
speech. Thus at least a part of what is involved in being an individual is a matter of bemg 
embedded in relationships to others where collective intentions operate. Note, then, 
When individuals express 'we' intentions, they make what others want part of ~hat they 
want, so that their own identities are partially relational in nature. At the same tlIl~e, they 
?O so in a non-instrumentally rational way, since in the ~xpression o~ a 'we' intentIOn ,on~ 
~s (de~ntologically) obliged to put things in a way to WhICh others wIll ag~ee for that we 
!nt~~tIon to be successful, quite apart from one's preferen~es. The chOIce to express a 
We Intention could be understood in an instrumentally ratIOnal manner, but the actual 
expression of it must be non-instrumentally rational. 
. For both Bacharach and collective intentionality theory, then, individuals' person~l 
Identities can be understood to have a relational character. However, the degree of thIS 
relationality is not same, as reflected in the different kinds of social i~entities. in~olve~. 
~acharach is largely though not exclusively concerned with cat:go?~al socIal IdentI-
tIes Which typically involve considerable social distance between IndIvIduals and those 
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with whom they identify. Collective intentionality theory, at least as developed around 
the logic of success conditions for 'we' intentions, makes a person's contact with others 
central, and accordingly puts more emphasis on relational social identity. We may con-
sequently distinguish between these two ways of talking about personal identity as rela-
tional according to the different kinds of reciprocity associated with these different kinds 
of social identity. Bacharach's view better fits instrumentally rational or conditional 
reciprocity, while collective intentionality theory better fits non-instrumentally rational 
or unilateral reciprocity. More could be said about this basic distinction, but for com-
parative purposes, the following section turns to what this might tell us about the implicit 
view of personal identity in the standard Homo economicus view of the individual. 
THE PERSONAL IDENTITY OF HOMO ECONOMIC US 
Though standard economics does not employ the concept of personal identity, it is fair 
to say that it identifies individuals with their utility functions or as collections of well-
ordered preferences defined in terms of a set of axiomatic assumptions ascribed to those 
preferences. However, much experimental research has cast doubt on whether these 
assumptions have a sound empirical basis (see Starmer, 2000). If these assumptions do 
not hold, or if they require significant revision, then it becomes unclear whether they 
can still support a unique monotonic utility function which would represent individuals' 
personal identities. In addition to this problem, there is an even more serious problem 
with the utility function representation of individuals' personal identities. Individuals' 
preferences are also always assumed to be their own preferences and not someone else's. 
Indee~, two people could have identical preferences, but on the standard view would ~e 
two different people because those preferences in each case would still be their own. ThiS 
means, then, that the definition of the individual as a single distinct being is circular, 
because it makes individuals' identities depend on having their own preferences. Having 
an 'own' set of preferences accordingly does not distinguish and identify an individual, 
~ut r~ther cou~ts as a formal procedure for mapping given preference ranking informa-
tion mto a ChOIce space for whoever or whatever is to be called an 'individua1' (person, 
firm, nati~n, ~eural.proc~ss, etc.) to which those preferences belong. As Gerhard Debreu 
aptly put It, an aXlOmatlzed theory has a mathematical form that is completely sepa-
rated fro~ its economic content' (Debreu, 1986, p.1265). . 
, The, utIhty func~ion ~onception of the individual, then, fails as an account of an indi-
Vidual s personal IdentIty. SInce the circularity problem is at the root of this, it makes 
se~se to ask how one would go about explaining personal identity in a way that avoids t~IS problem. ~ha~ ~ould invo~ve. describing the individual in a manner that do~s not 
p e~up?~se the mdividual, that IS, In terms of characteristics that do not refer to or Imply ~he m?lvId~al, as in the case of having an own set of preferences. There are different ways 
In whl,ch thiS can be done (see Davis, 2011), but one element that can profitably be drawn 
upon IS patterns of relationships between people as in the two relational views of identity 
set out above Th b "d . ' . d' 'd 
. .' e aSIc 1 . ea IS that patterns of relationships between people can 1D IVI -~ahze pa~tlcular persons If they occupy distinct locations in these patterns. The advan-
age of thIS approach is that reference to 'patterns of relationships between people' does 
not presuppose any particular individuals who might be identified by those patterns, and 
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thus potentially makes it possible to pick them out as individuals in a non-circular way. 
Explaining individuals' personal identities in this way would then also make it possible to 
investigate how individuals' personal identities could be seen to evolve over time as indi-
viduals' social relationships change. This allows for a variety of views of what individual 
personal identity involves alternative to the standard Homo economicus conception, and 
as the discussion here has argued provides additional foundations for explaining behav-
ior in connection with such phenomena as reciprocity. 
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